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1.  REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY
Recent years have seen a surge of academic and policy attention devoted to the
notion of ‘competitiveness’: nations, regions and cities, we are told, have no option but to
strive to be competitive in order to survive in the new global marketplace and the ‘new
competition’ (BEST, 1990, 1998) being forged by the new information or knowledge-
driven economy. Policy-makers at all levels have been swept up in this competitiveness
fever. Thus the importance of competitiveness has been a recurring theme in OECD
assessments of the advanced economies.  Similarly, the European Commission has become
much exercised by what it sees as the inferior competitiveness of the European Union, and
has set as one of its goals the catch-up of EU competitiveness with that of the US by 2010.
Likewise, the UK government has placed the need to boost national competitiveness at the
centre of its policy agenda.
This concern with competitiveness has quickly spread to regional, urban and local
policy discourse. Growing interest has emerged in the ‘regional foundations’ of national
competitiveness, and with developing new forms of regionally-based policy interventions
to help improve the competitiveness of every region and major city, and hence the national
economy as a whole. In the UK, for example, the Government has assigned increasing
importance to the competitiveness of the country’s regions and cities as part of its re-
orientation of national and regional policy (HM Treasury, 2001, 2002; DTI, 2001; ODPM,
2002, 2003). In the EU, the issue of regional competitiveness has taken on particular
significance not only in relation to its aim to close the ‘competitiveness gap’ with the US,
but also as part of its pursuit of social and economic cohesion. Raising the competitiveness
of Europe’s lagging and less prosperous regions is regarded as crucial to social cohesion,
especially in the context of monetary union and EU enlargement.  In fact, a still small but
rapidly growing literature now exists on the topic of ‘territorial competitiveness’ (see, for
example,).
However, this new focus on ‘place competitiveness’ raises a host of questions as to
what, precisely, is meant by the competitiveness of regions, cities and localities. In what
sense can one talk of regional competitiveness? In what sense do regions and cities3
compete? Traditionally, neither economists nor economic geographers have tended to
frame their discussions of regional growth and development in terms of such questions, or
certainly not explicitly in the language of competitiveness. Only recently has this state of
affairs begun to change (see for, example, STEINLE, 1992; CHESHIRE and GORDON,
1995; DUFFY, 1995; GROUP OF LISBON, 1995; STORPER, 1995, 1997; JENSEN-
BUTLER et al. 1997; BEGG, 1999, 2002; URBAN STUDIES. 1999; CAMAGNI, 2003;
PORTER, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2003). But, these contributions notwithstanding, we
are still far from any general consensus about the nature and measurement of regional
competitiveness.   A  not  uncommon  theme,  however,  is  that  regional  (and  urban)
competitiveness has to do with the success with which regions and cities compete with one
another over shares of national and especially global export markets.  This notion would
seem to underpin the European Commission’s interpretation of the term:
[Competitiveness is defined as] the ability to produce goods and services
which meet the test of international markets, while at the same time
maintaining high and sustainable levels of income or, more generally, the
ability  of  (regions)  to  generate,  while  being  exposed  to  external
competition,  relatively  high  income  and  employment  levels…
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1999, p. 4).
Given that regional economies are almost certain to be more open (to trade) than the
national economies of which they are a part, this focus on export performance would seem
to be warranted.  The ‘export base’ of a region or city has long been viewed as key to
regional and urban prosperity, as recently re-emphasised by ROWTHORN (1999):
The prosperity of a region is determined primarily by the strength of its
export base … all those activities which bring income into the region by
providing a good or service to the outside world… . The alternative term
'tradables' is also used to denote such activities (pp. 22-23).
The implication of this line of argument would seem to be that a reduction in the size of a
region’s export base, or a deterioration in the region’s trade balance, or both, would signal a
decline in regional competitiveness.  This approach is very similar to that found in many
definitions of national competitiveness, as for example in TYSON’s (1992) Who’s Bashing
Whom, where (US) national competitiveness is defined as “our ability to produce goods and
services that meet the test of international competition while our citizen’s enjoy a standard
of living that is both rising and sustainable” (p. 10).4
Yet, as KRUGMAN (1996a, 1996b) and others (such as GROUP OF LISBON,
1995) have pointed out, there may less to this view of competitiveness than meets the eye.
Thus Krugman, making frequent reference to the USA, has argued that:
Concerns about  competitiveness are,  as  an  empirical  matter,  almost
always completely unfounded… The obsession with competitiveness is
not only wrong but dangerous… thinking in terms of competitiveness
leads to bad economic policies on a range of issues (KRUGMAN, 1996a,
p. 5).
He raises three points of opposition to the idea of national competitiveness. In the first
place, he argues that it is misleading and incorrect to make an analogy between a nation and
a firm; whereas, for example, an unsuccessful firm will ultimately go out of business, there
is no equivalent ‘bottom line’ for a nation.  Second, whereas firms can be seen to compete
for market share, and one firm’s success will often be at the expense of another, the success
of one country creates rather than destroys opportunities for others, and trade between
nations is well known not to be a ‘zero-sum’ game. Third, if competitiveness has any
meaning, then it is simply another way of saying productivity; that growth in national living
standards is essentially determined by the growth rate of productivity.
Michael Porter, who has been amongst the most influential writers on ‘competitive
advantage’ – of firm, industries, nations and regions and cities - also suggests that the best
measure of competitiveness is productivity:
Competitiveness remains a concept that is not well understood, despite
widespread acceptance of its importance. To understand competitiveness,
the starting point must be the sources of a nation’s prosperity. A nation’s
standard of living is determined by the productivity of its economy, which
is measured by the value of its goods and services produced per unit of the
nation’s human, capital and natural resources. Productivity depends both
on the value of a nation’s products and services, measured by the prices
they can command in open markets, and the efficiency with which they
can be produced. True competitiveness, then, is measured by productivity.
Productivity allows a nation to support high wages, a strong currency and
attractive returns to capital, and with them a high standard of living
(PORTER and KETELS, 2003, emphasis added).
The issue is whether this line of argument applies equally to regions and cities.
CELLINI and SOCI (2002) argue that the notion of regional competitiveness is neither a
macro-economic (national) nor micro-economic (firm-based) one: regions are neither
simple aggregations of firms, nor are they scaled-down versions of nations. CAMAGNI5
(2003) takes a similar view. He suggests that regions do indeed compete, but on the basis of
absolute advantage rather than comparative advantage. A region may be thought of as
having absolute competitive advantages when it possesses superior technological, social,
infrastructural or institutional) assets that are external to but which benefit individual firms
such that no set of alternative factor prices would induce a geographical redistribution of
economic  activity.  These  assets  tend  to  give  the  region’s  firms,  overall,  a  higher
productivity than would otherwise be the case.   As the EUROPEAN COMMISSION
(1999) puts it:
[The idea of regional competitiveness] should capture the notion that,
despite the fact that there are strongly competitive and uncompetitive
firms in every region, there are common features within a region which
affect the competitiveness of all firms located there (p. 5)
This is not to suggest that the export performance of regions is unimportant: to the contrary,
the comparative advantage of a region’s export sectors is still key to its overall growth and
prosperity. Competition between regions (both within and between nations) may exclude a
region from an industry in which it could have established a comparative advantage, or
drive  a  region  from  an  industry  in  which  comparative  advantage  could  have  been
maintained (especially bearing in mind that regions do not have recourse to currency
devaluation,  nor  posses  the  price-wage  flexibility,  that  might  alleviate  competitive
disadvantage in the short run). But the basic point is that regional competitive advantage is
both absolute and comparative in nature, and that productivity is not only important in
influencing the comparative advantage of a region’s export sectors, but is important across
the whole range of its industries and services, not just to keep up with external competitors.
In the remainder of this paper, we focus attention on the pattern and dynamics of
regional  productivity  across  the  European  Union.  As  noted  above,  the  European
Commission has highlighted the importance of regional competitiveness for its goal of
social cohesion. In addition, the competitiveness of the EU regions is of key significance
for the success of the new Single Currency (monetary union) and the major phase of
membership enlargement that is about to get underway (MARTIN, 2001; 2003). In the next
section, we review some of the conceptual issues involved in thinking about regional
productivity differences and evolutions. In order to undertake our empirical analysis, in6
Section 3 we construct a new hours-worked measure of productivity for the EU regions,
and examine the pattern and scale of regional productivity differences across the EU,
including the Central and East European accession states. Section 4 addresses the important
question of whether regional productivity is converging across the Union, and Section 5
relates both productivity growth and changes in employment rates to the pattern of regional
per capita GDP growth across the EU. The final section outlines some of the implications
of our findings. Throughout, our analysis refers to the NUTS2-level regions, and draws on
historical time series data collated and compiled by Cambridge Econometrics.
2.  REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY: SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
At the outset it should be stressed that the concept of productivity is itself far from
straightforward. The standard notion of productivity refers to the productive efficiency of a
given workforce, that is labour productivity, measured in terms of output per input of
labour.  This is an aggregative notion, and as Figure 1 suggests, in a regional context labour
productivity is the outcome of a variety of determinants (including the sort of regional
assets alluded to above). Many of these regional factors and assets also determine a
region’s overall employment rate.   Together, productivity and the employment rate are
measures of what might be termed ‘revealed competitiveness’, and both are central
components of a region’s economic performance and its prosperity (as measured say by
GDP per head), though obviously of themselves tell us little about the underlying regional
attributes (‘sources of competitiveness’) on which they depend.  For it would be somewhat
perverse to describe a ‘competitive’ region solely in terms of its productivity because a
region’s productivity can increase significantly if the firms located there underwent a major
phase of rationalisation and downsizing, involving the closure of the least efficient firms
and layoff of the least efficient workers. Such one-off rationalisation-induced increases in
productivity may not be associated with any overall increase in the output of the region (nor
with any improvement in the region’s absolute competitive advantage), but with a rise in
unemployment that may end up being very difficult to solve. In such circumstances,
employment reduction is a ‘negative’ route to raising regional productivity, and is to be
contrasted with regions that have both high productivity and employment.7
Figure 1 suggests that productivity may differ between regions for a host of different
reasons.  But equally important is how such differences are predicted to evolve over time.
In the standard Neoclassical model the growth of productivity (output per worker) depends
on the growth of capital per worker and the (exogenous) rate of technical progress (or total
Figure 1
factor productivity) Hence, regional differences in productivity growth are explained by
regional differences in the rate of (exogenous) technical progress and by regional
differences in the growth of the capital labour ratio. But given that the model also
assumes constant returns to scale, diminishing returns to labour and capital, and complete
factor mobility - including the unimpeded diffusion of technological advance – regional
productivity disparities are predicted to narrow over time, as initially low productivity
regions catch up with initially high productivity ones (Table 1). Neoclassical growth
Quality of life
Standard of living




























[Based on: Lengyel (2000, 2003), Begg (1999), EC (1999), Jensen-Butler (1996)]
Sources of
competitiveness8
models of regional convergence have been much researched in recent years with varying
empirical results (for a survey, see MARTIN and SUNLEY, 1998).
In endogenous growth models, on the other hand, where technical change is
argued to be itself determined by the growth process, the implications for the evolution of
regional variations in productivity over time depend on the assumptions made about the
Table 1
Three Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Productivity Growth
Theory Explanation of regional
productivity differences
Evolution of regional productivity
differences
Neoclassical Growth Theory Regional differences in





Assumes constant returns to scale;
diminishing returns to factors of
production; free factor mobility and
geographical diffusion of
technology, so that low productivity
regions should catch up with high
productivity one; ie regional
convergence in productivity
Endogenous Growth Theory Regional differences in
productivity due to differences
in capital/labour ratios,
knowledge base and
proportion of workforce in
knowledge producing
industries
Implications for regional productivity
evolutions depends on extent to
which low technology regions catch
up with high technology regions,
and this on degree of geographical
diffusion of technology and
knowledge, and flows of knowledge
workers.  The more
knowledge/technology spillovers
are localised, and the more
knowledge workers move to leading
technology regions the more
productivity differences between





key sources of externalities
and increasing returns (labour,
knowledge spillovers,
specialist suppliers, etc)  that
give local firms higher
productivity
Economic integration (trade, factor
flows) increases tendency to spatial
agglomeration and specialisation of
economic activity, leading to ‘core-
periphery’ equilibria and persistent
regional differences in productivity.9
process of technical progress. For example, in the Romer version of the endogenous
growth model, the rate of growth of technological knowledge is assumed to be a function
of the growth in the numbers of workers employed in knowledge-producing activities. If
it is further assumed that technological progress diffuses rapidly across geographical
space, then we might expect that technical progress in any given region will depend upon
the extent to which its own technology lags behind the technology of the most advanced
region(s). Low technology regions should therefore experience the fastest growth in
output per worker, which means that regional convergence in productivity is predicted to
occur in this version of the endogenous growth model. However, there is now ample
empirical  work  that  suggests  that  the  spatial  diffusion  of  technology  is  far  from
instantaneous as assumed in the Neoclassical model. It is well known that certain regions
appear to be innovation leaders. They are the sources of basic inventions and take the
lead in applying these innovations in the form of new products and services, or more
efficient ways of producing existing products.   It seems that technology spillovers tend
to be localised, and to be an important source of geographically-concentrated externalities
and increasing returns. Regional convergence in productivity may thus be a slow process.
The more so if, the leading innovative regions also attract knowledge and highly skilled
workers  from  other  regions.  Under  such  conditions,  not  only  may  productivity
differences between regions persist, they may even widen over time (see MARTIN and
SUNLEY, op cit, for a review of regional endogenous growth models).
Not unrelated to endogenous growth theory, the ‘new economic geography’
models  that  have  become  popular  in  recent  years  (see  FUJITA,  KRUGMAN  and
VENABLES, 1999; BRACKMAN, GARRETSEN and MARREWIJK, 2001; FUJITA
and THISSE, 2002; BALDWIN et al, 2003), attribute regional differences in growth to
localised  increasing  returns  arising  from  the  spatial  agglomeration  of  specialised
economic activity and the external economies and endogenous effects such localised
specialisation generates (accumulation of skilled labour, local knowledge spillovers,
specialised suppliers and services, and so on).  The existence of localised externalities,
and hence the limited geographical range of knowledge spillovers, may be due to locally
embedded socio-cultural, political and institutional structures and practices that can all10
contribute to the localisation of these external economies (MARTIN, 2000). They can
help to explain not only why some regions (and cities) have a higher productivity and
growth rate than others (see SVEIKAUSKAS, 1975, for an early but cogent account of
why productivity varies between cities), but also why such differences might not diminish
over time. Many of the ‘new economic geography’ models in fact predict a ‘core-
periphery’ equilibrium pattern of productivity (DAVIS and WEINSTEIN, 2001).
The different prognoses of long-run trends in regional productivity and incomes
given by these various models are not simply of academic interest.  All three types of
model have been used to predict what is likely to happen to regional productivity and per
capita incomes across the EU as the process of economic integration (EMU) deepens. As
integration proceeds – and trade, factor flows, and regulatory harmonisation all increase –
so Neoclassical models predict accelerating convergence.  The endogenous growth and
‘new economic  geography’ models, on  the  other hand  predict increasing regional
specialisation and spatial concentration of economic activity and growth, and hence no
necessary convergence. The different models also carry different implications for the
trajectories of regional development in the new accession states as they become exposed
to and integrated with the EU market. Examining the temporal evolution of regional
productivity disparities across the EU is thus crucial to resolving this theoretical debate.
3.  REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY: SOME MEASUREMENT ISSUES
There are several measures of productivity, but the most common is output per
employed worker. In the European case, this is the easiest to calculate because regional
data on output and employment are readily available from Eurostat’s Regio database.
However, this employment measure suffers from not being a direct measure of labour
input.   Hours-worked is the better indicator as people work different weekly hours in
different countries and this should be taken account of when measuring productivity.  In
the past it has not been possible to distinguish regional productivity as output per hour-
due to data limitations, but two versions of an hours-worked measure of productivity are
possible.  One is a new data series of regional hours work derived from the Labour Force
Survey (LFS), which takes account of differences in part-time and full-time employment,
These data were supplied by the European Commission. The alternative measure of hours11
worked is a composition-derived estimate based on regional sectoral structure and national
sectoral average hours-worked.
The sectoral hours-worked measure, calculated by applying national sectoral
hours-worked data to a region’s industrial structure to build up a total hours worked series,
represents an improvement on just using employment, but there is still the problem of
distinguishing between part and full-time employment, as the sectoral hours-worked series
relates to full-time employees only.  If the relative proportions of workers in each category
were the same across countries/regions this would not be a problem. But Figure 2 clearly
shows that significant differences exist.
The effect would be that for countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, which
have a relatively high proportion of part-time employment, productivity would be
artificially deflated while the employment rate would be correspondingly inflated. To
correct for this distortion, an adjusted (that is, averaging across part and full-time
employment categories) regional weekly hours-worked series, is used here.  This has
  Figure 2
The Share of Part-Time in Total Employment across EU Countries
























































been combined with the headcount employment measure to create a more accurate
representation of labour input and hence productivity.
Figure 3 shows the correlation between the sectoral and LFS hours-worked
measures of productivity, both based on PPS and EU15=100 normalisation.  Although
the correspondence between the two measures is quite close, for some regions the
differences between the two definitions is quite large.   As Figure 4 indicates, these
differences run mainly along national lines, with regions in the Netherlands, Italy, the UK
and much of Germany recording a higher productivity per hour worked using the LFS
measure than the sector-based one; and vice versa for regions in Belgium, Denmark,
Spain, and some new accession countries. These results are broadly in line with the
national differences in the relative importance of part-time employment shown in Figure
2, and confirm that failure to take proper account of part-time employment could lead to
incorrect estimates of regional productivity
                     Figure 3
Labour Force Versus Sectoral Hours-Worked Productivity
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The LFS hours-based measure of productivity is not without its problems,
however.  The LFS data refer to an individual’s main job, rather than all work carried out.
In addition, the LFS data are residence-based, whereas GDP data are occupation-based,
so the two do not necessarily match precisely. Nonetheless, the results do seem an
improvement on the sectorally constructed hours-worked series.
Figure 4
Ratio of Labour Force to Sector Based Regional Productivity, 200114
Estimates of regional productivity, using this LFS hours-worked measure, are
shown in Figure 5. Regional differences in labour productivity across the Union are
substantial. Within the EU-15 group of countries, productivity ranges from only around
50 percent of the EU-15 in some regions of Portugal and Greece, to about 150 percent of
the EU-15 average in certain regions of the Netherlands, Austria, France and Belgium.
Almost the whole of France, northern Italy, Austria, Demark, much of Finland and parts
of Ireland, the southeast of England, and some areas in southern Germany, emerge as
having the highest productivity.   These differences are only partly accounted for by
regional  differences  in  industrial  structures  and  specialisation  (see  CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMETRICS  et  al,  2003).  The  former  East  Germany,  the  Central  and  East
European accession states, and Portugal have the lowest productivity. There is some
indication  of  a  broad  ‘core-periphery’  pattern  of  regional  productivity  across  the
European Union, although the high productivity outliers found in southern Ireland, and
Finland complicates any such generalisation.
At the same time, it is apparent is that regional disparities in productivity are a
characteristic feature of almost every EU-15 member state, including those in which
regional productivity levels in general are high by EU-15 standards. Indeed, regional
productivity disparities in productivity are noticeably wider than in the new accession
states, which tend to have almost uniformly low productivity levels. In effect, the
enlargement of the Union to include the Central and East European states will add a large
low productivity periphery to the economic landscape of the EU, in which productivity
will be only around half of the EU-15 average and in some regions only around 40
percent.  The key issue, of course, is whether these regional differences in productivity
across the EU have been narrowing or widening over time, and it to this question that we
now turn.15
Figure 5
Regional Productivity across the EU, 2001
(LFS hours-worked measure)
4.  EVIDENCE ON THE CONVERGENCE OF REGIONAL PRODUCTIVITY
ACROSS THE EU
The standard Neoclassical growth model predicts the catch-up of initially low
productivity regions, on the grounds of factor price equalisation across regions, rapid
technology transfer, as well as diminishing returns to labour and capital; that is to say,
initially low productivity regions should record higher rates of growth than initially high16
productivity regions. Other alternative models of regional growth, of the sort discussed
above, do not necessarily predict any convergence at all. Almost all of the empirical
analyses  that have been conducted thus far have focused on regional GDP per capita,
rather than regional productivity, and have tended to suggest that regional convergence in
the EU is at best a very slow process typically only 1-2 percent per annum, implying that
it would take several decades for any significant narrowing of regional disparities in per
capita GDP to occur (see ARMSTRONG and CHESHIRE, 1996; MARTIN AND
SUNLEY, 1998; BUTTON and PENTECOST, 1999).
Figure 6
Slow Convergence in Regional Productivity Across EU Regions, 1980-2001
(Data refer to 1980 and 2001 for EU-15 regions, and 1993 and 2001 for CEEC regions)
The LFS hours-worked measure of productivity for the NUTS2 regions of the basic
EU-15 member countries shows some measure of convergence over the 1980s and 1990s
(Figure 6). It has been the regions that had the lowest productivity levels in 1980 that have
registered the highest productivity growth – in many cases of between 2-4 per cent per
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Convergence  rate = 1.3 percent per annum17
productivity growth rates of less than 1 percent per annum. The relationship between
initial regional productivity relativities and subsequent productivity growth is negative, as
indicated by the straightforward correlation of –0.64. But if a logarithmic relationship is
fitted – as in the Barro–type Neoclassical growth regression (BARRO and SALA-I-
MARTIN, 1995) – the slope is weak, and yields an annual absolute convergence rate of
1.3 percent per annum, indicating that it would take around 35 years for initial regional
disparities in productivity to be halved.  Thus if regional productivity evolutions within the
EU-15 are following a Neoclassical growth process, it is an extremely slow one.
If we include the CEEC states, so that our data are restricted to the more recent
1993-2001 period, it has been the regions in these countries that have experienced the
most rapid growth in productivity, with real growth rates in excess of 4 percent per annum
in some cases. Above average rates of growth have also been recorded by regions in
Sweden, Greece, throughout much of Italy, and in Ireland (Figure 7).   Thus while the
regional pattern of productivity growth is rather mixed across the EU as a whole, the
evidence  indicates that  since  the  dissolution of  the  former Communist bloc  at  the
beginning of the 1990s, the very low productivity regions of the CCEC countries have
managed to improved their labour productivity much faster than most other regions of the
EU, although of course they have a very along way to go to catch up with the core regions
of the EU-15.
Two issues that have received surprisingly little empirical analysis in the literature
on regional convergence are whether and to what extent convergence varies with the
economic cycle, and with the relative specialisation of regions in traded (export) sectors
of activity as against non-traded sectors.  With regard to the effect of the economic cycle,
it has been noted that absolute regional differences in unemployment in EU countries
rates tend to vary counter-cyclically, widening during recessions and narrowing during
booms (BADDELEY, MARTIN and TYLER, 1998; MARTIN, 1998). It might be
expected therefore that regional productivity disparities might also narrow during boom
periods, as low productivity regions are particularly well placed to take advantage of the
expansionary economic conditions and to expand output per worker accordingly. On the
other hand, given such regions are also likely to be those with the highest unemployment,
and hence ready pools of available labour, it could be that the main impact of general18
economic boom in such areas is the expansion of output via increases in employment
rather than major boost in productivity. This would be consistent with the tendency for
regional unemployment disparities to narrow in boom periods.
Figure 7
Regional Productivity Growth across the EU, 1993-2001
(LFS hours-worked measure)19
Over the 1980-2001 period under study here, the EU experienced two major
economic cycles: recession in the early1980s, followed by a strong recovery and boom in
the second half the 1980s; then another downturn in the early-1990s, followed by
recovery in the second half of that decade. As Figure 8 shows, overall EU productivity
growth has varied pro-cyclically, being higher in both boom periods (averaging 2 percent
per annum in real terms) than in the recessionary periods (just under 1.5 percent in the
1980-1985 recessionary period, and less than 1 percent in the first half of the 1990s).  The
rate of convergence in regional productivity across the EU-15 also followed the economic
cycle up to the mid-1990s, being lower in recession and faster in recovery, but failed to
increase again in the boom of the second half of the decade.   In effect, the rate of
convergence in regional productivity across the EU has been falling since the late-1980,
precisely the time when EU economic integration has accelerated.
Figure 8

























































































Another aspect of regional productivity convergence concerns the impact of
economic structure, and in particular the relative importance of traded and non-traded
sectors. Recall from Section 1 that the productivity of a region’s tradable (export) base is
often regarded as the key to that region’s overall economic performance and prosperity.
Because, by definition, a region’s export activities are directly exposed to competition
from similar activities in other regions, the supposition is that this openness should
expose the sectors in question to pressures that make for constant improvements in
technology, efficiency, investment, product design and so on if a region’s exporting firms
are to remain competitive.  Regional non-traded activities, that serve local markets, are
not exposed to such external competitive pressure. Thus the expectation is that regional
convergence in productivity should be faster in traded sectors than in non-traded ones.
Sectoral data limitations at the regional level prevent a detailed evaluation of this
issue, in the sense of being able to isolate the export base of individual regions, but a
preliminary analysis is possible in the case of the EU-15 states by recalculating regional
productivity separately for two aggregate sectors that correspond in broad terms to
‘traded’ and ‘non-traded’ activities. The former was defined to include manufacturing,
energy, business services (including finance), and intermediate services; and the latter to
include construction, household services, and public sector services. This is obviously
only an approximate decomposition, since not all local manufacturing industries or
financial services need export, while some construction activities and household services
are exported out of regions.   Nevertheless, our broad division should be sufficient to
capture any significant productivity differences between traded and non-traded activity
across regions, and whether these two sectors differ in their convergence behaviour over
time.
The results are quite instructive (Figure 9). First, as perhaps expected, start-year
average productivity levels in the EU-15 regions were noticeably higher in traded
activities than in non-traded. Second, the evidence suggests that regional productivity
convergence in traded activities has been no faster, in fact slower, than that in the non-
traded sector.  This is, perhaps, surprising, given that traded activities are likely to be
much more exposed to external competition. On the other hand, since the composition of
household and public services tends to be similar across regions, we might expect21
productivity differences to be small and to diminish over time. Interestingly, productivity
levels in non-traded activities were noticeably less variable across regions to begin with.
Figure 9
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Convergence rate = 0.8 percent per annum
Convergence rate = 1.1 percent per annum22
Third, regional productivity growth rates have tended to be lower in non-traded than in
traded activities. Clearly, these findings are highly tentative, and more detailed analysis is
needed before any definitive statements can be made about the impacts of openness and
the ‘export base’ on long-run regional productivity trends.
5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
Following the logic of Figure 1, the outcome of regional competitive success can
be defined as a high level of GDP per capita. This in turn can be decomposed into four
elements, each of which has a direct economic interpretation: productivity (measured as
GDP per hour worked), the employment rate, the dependency rate, and the work-leisure
trade off.  That is:
(Productivity)       (Work-Leisure)        (Employment Rate)          (Dependency Rate)
As  indicated  earlier,  productivity  is  one  of  two  key  measures  of  ‘revealed
competitiveness’ – the other being the employment rate. These in turn are also two of the
components of the conventional indicator of regional per capita GDP.  In this section we
explore the contribution of productivity and the employment rate to regional per capita
GDP growth across the Union.
Since the early-1990s, growth in GDP per capita has tended to be fastest in the
peripheral areas of Europe, particularly those in Central and Eastern European countries,
together with Spain, Ireland, Portugal and part of Greece (Figure 10).  These areas also
tend to be those with lower levels of GDP per capita, with the exception of Ireland which
has overtaken the EU-15 average. Notable exceptions to this rule include the South East
region in the UK and southern Sweden, areas that are prosperous and that have had high
rates of economic growth.   Overall, the rate of convergence of per capita GDP across














Real GDP per Capita Growth across the EU Regions, 1993-2001
And this seems to have been almost entirely due to the to rapid convergence that took
place during the pronounced economic boom of the second half of the 1980s. Outside this
sub-period, convergence has been negligible or non-existent, in much the same way as
for productivity. Thus regional disparities in per capita GDP across the EU display a high
degree of persistence, with the pattern in 2001 bearing a strong similarity with that in
1980 (see also MARTIN, 2001): the correlation between the two is high (see Figure 11).
In fact, as Figure 12 indicates, the regional dispersion of productivity within member
states  has  not  changed  significantly:  what  is  also  evident  is  that  while  average24
productivity levels may have become more similar between nations, within-nation
regional differences have not narrowed and in some cases (UK, Italy, Netherlands,
Austria, Germany) have actually increased. Also evident is the fact that the vast majority
of the CEEC regions have GDP per capita levels well below 75 percent of the EU-15
average.
Figure 11
The Persistence of Regional Disparities in Economic Prosperity in the EU
How do productivity and the employment rate influence these regional differences
in per capita GDP growth? Table 2 examines the components of per capita GDP by three
broad groups of regions: those with per capita GDP less than 75 percent of the EU-15
average (what has been the threshold for eligibility for Structural Fund support), those
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capita GDP greater than the EU-15 average. The dependency rate shows little variation
across these three regional groups, while the hours worked component shows only minor
variation, and what exists indicates a negative association with GDP per capita: that is,
regions with lower GDP per capita have a higher than average level of working hours. The
explanation may lie in the sectoral structure of production; for example, regions which
specialise in agriculture have a higher number of weekly hours worked, and so the lower
productivity of such activities leads to a lower level of GDP per capita.
Table 2
Components of GDP Per Capita by Relative Level of Regional Prosperity,
2001
                                                                                GDP COMPONENT







capita Sectoral    LFS Sectoral   LFS
  Empl
  Rate
     Dep
    Rate
 Less than
 75% EU





 average    87 88.07 96.59 94.85 99.05 100.26 95.86 98.53
 More than
 EU
 average 71 121.78 112.92 111.37 99.68 100.21 110.53 100.12
Productivity and the employment rate clearly account for most the variation in
average GDP per capita across the three regional groups. In terms of levels, both the
employment rate and productivity share a common association with GDP per capita,
largely because both are positively linked to economic development; that is, more
successful  regions  have  well  developed  economies  with  reasonably  high  labour
participation rates (in particular a higher participation rate among women), and by and27
large a productive workforce (see Figure 13).  Once growth rates are analysed, however,
it quickly becomes apparent that productivity and not employment is the main link with
GDP per capita growth (Figure 14).  This result supports the argument that ultimately (in
the long-term) it is technological progress that drives growth.  Bringing more people into
the labour market can produce a short-term effect, but, migration issues aside, there is a
natural constraint on how far such an effect can go.  This leaves productivity as the main
driver of per capita GDP.
Figure 13
GDP Per Capita, Productivity and Employment across EU Regions
However, this result combines both western European regions and those in the
CEEC accession states.  As we have already seen, the latter have recorded some of the
highest growth rates in per capita GDP across the European economic space in recent
years. But this appears to have been primarily due to marked increases in productivity
rather than to improvements in employment rates: indeed, employment rate growth in
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rates of productivity growth found amongst many of the regions in the Central and East
European  Accession  states  has  been  attributable  in  part  to  ‘labour  shake-out’
(rationalisation) effects.  Such effects may give a boost to productivity over the short-run,
but cannot be the source of sustained productivity growth and catch-up with the rest of
the  EU  over  the  longer  term.   Also,  of  course,  labour  shake-out exacerbates
unemployment, which in turn frustrates the pursuit of social cohesion.
Figure 14
Growth of GDP Per Capita, Productivity and Employment across EU
Regions
Note:  Average growth (% per annum) over 1980-2001, except for some German Regions (1993-
2001), Flevoland (1986-2001) and all Accession Countries (1993-2001).
.
7. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Although there is considerable debate amongst academics and policy makers as to
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productivity represents one of its most important ‘revealed’ measures.  In the light of the
adoption of the Single Market from 1992 onwards and the more establishment of a single
currency space, it is perhaps not surprising that policy makers across Europe have been
keen to establish what has been happening to regional disparities in productivity and
whether there is evidence of convergence, that is whether the weaker regions are
Table 3: Productivity Growth and Employment Rate Decline in Top Ten
Growth Regions in CCEC, 1993-2001 (Annual % rates)
   Country    Region    GDP/hd
   Growth
    Productivity
    Growth
   Emp Rate
   Growth
  Poland   Mazowieckie 7.93 7.81 -2.48
  Hungary   Nyugat-Dunántúl 5.78 6.05 -1.84
  Bulgaria   Yugoiztochen 5.45 5.78 -1.96
  Poland   Wielkopolskie 5.44 5.63 -2.05
  Hungary   Közép-Dunántúl 5.04 4.43 -0.55
  Hungary   Kozép-Magyarország 4.57 4.53 -0.41
  Poland   Malopolskie 4.23 4.50 -2.37
  Poland
  Poland













catching-up with the stronger ones. This interest reflects not only a desire by policy
makers to enhance the overall efficiency of the Union so that its economic performance is
more in line with that of the United States, but also a genuine concern that regions with
relatively poor productivity performance should not be at a disadvantage in the context of
monetary union and EU enlargement.
In  this  paper,  we  have  sought  to  investigate  some  of  the  conceptual  and
measurement problems that arise in measuring regional variations in productivity and, for
the first time, have used new evidence based on an output per hour worked measure that,
whilst not without its own problems, does provide a better indication of the underlying
concept relative to previous indicators (such as output per head, or output per employee).
The output per hour worked measure reveals a number of areas of higher than average
productivity: much of France, and especially the Paris sub-region and Provence-Alpes-31
Coted’Azur; almost all of Belgium; northern and central Italy; almost all of Austria;
Demark; much of Finland, southern Ireland, parts of southeast England; and some areas
in  southern  Germany.  The  former  East  Germany,  the  Central  and  East  European
accession states, and Portugal have the lowest productivity. There is thus some indication
of a broad ‘core-periphery’ pattern of regional productivity across the European Union,
although there are high productivity outliers found in southern Ireland, and Finland. What
is all too clear, however, is that the enlargement of the Union to include the Central and
East European states will add a large low productivity periphery to the economic
landscape of the EU.
There are widely differing views amongst economists as to the determinants of
regional productivity and what happens to regional disparities in productivity over time.
Standard Neoclassical theory predicts that with increasing economic and monetary
integration, low productivity regions should catch up with high productivity regions. In
the context of the EU, such convergence is an important dimension of the goal of
‘cohesion’.   However, other economic theories – which emphasise the importance of
various forms of increasing returns – suggest that increasing integration does not
necessarily lead to regional convergence in productivity (or GDP per head), and may in
fact reproduce or even reinforce existing regional differences, leading to regional
divergence or growing core-periphery patterns of productivity and competitiveness, The
empirical results presented in this paper suggest that while some initially low productivity
regions (most notably Ireland) have improved their relative position within the EU over
the past twenty years or so, a period of accelerating integration, the general degree of
catch up (convergence) has been disappointingly slow (not much more than 1 percent per
annum). And much of what convergence has occurred seems to have taken place in the
boom conditions of the second half of the 1980s; since then there has been very little if
any convergence. Furthermore, if the total variation in productivity across the regions of
the EU-15 is decomposed into within and between member state components, it appears
that there has been no discernible reduction in the former, and that the slight fall in total
region dispersion over the period has been entirely due to a reduction in between state
differentials (Figure 16). Overall our results accord more with the core-periphery models
of the new economic geography than with Neoclassical growth theory.32
What is evident, however, is that productivity growth is a key determinant of
regional economic prosperity: there is a strong positive relationship across regions
between productivity growth and growth in per capita GDP. Yet the rate of convergence
of per capita GDP across EU regions has been even slower than of productivity.  Part of
the explanation seems to reside in the way in which employment growth – the other main
component of per capita GDP growth – has varied across regions. In the EU-15, regions
appear to fall into two main groups: those that have enjoyed growth in productivity and
employment,  and  those  that  have  recorded  productivity  growth  but  falls  in  their
employment rate.  This latter combination suggests that in many regions across the EU,
productivity advances have come about as much through industrial rationalisation, labour































































































































Figure 16: Regional Dispersion of Productivity across the EU-15, 1980-
2001: Total, and Decomposition into Within and Between Member States.33
shakeout  and  capital  substitution  effects,  as  from  efficiency  raising  technological
progress, higher value products, and so on.  This is most apparent in the CEEC regions,
where high rates of productivity advance have been associated with significant falls in
employment.  Intense rationalisation and restructuring  - that is eliminating inefficient
enterprises and expelling inefficient workers – may give a marked boost to productivity
over the short run, but are obviously not a viable means of securing high rates of
productivity growth over the longer term. As mentioned above, regional competitiveness
implies both high productivity and a high employment rate. Neoclassical theory would
suggest that the cheap labour and low productivity of the CEEC regions (40 percent or
less of the EU-15 average) makes these regions attractive to the inflow of foreign capital
and investment, and thus that there is considerable scope for rapid productivity catch-up
with the rest of the EU.  New economic geography models, however, suggest that it is
equally likely that with enlargement, economic growth could continue to concentrate and
agglomerate in the existing core regions of the EU-15, and that the CEEC countries
themselves could well experience increasing regional inequalities in growth, productivity
and incomes as they adjust to the competitive market forces that membership of the EU
will expose them to.
The lack of any sustained and significant convergence in productivity across the
EU-15 regions over the 1980s and 1990s obviously raises questions about the efficacy of
EU regional policy. Despite the positive assessments by the European Commission that
EU regional policy has helped to narrow regional inequalities (European Commission,
2004), and the fact that there have undoubtedly been some notable individual regional
improvements, in general it is difficult to claim that the empirical evidence suggests
policy has been a resounding success.  It is of course problematic, if not impossible, to
construct  a  meaningful  counterfactual  of  what  would  have  happened  to  regional
productivity differences across the EU-15 in the absence of the Structural and Cohesion
Funds.  But if the hope was that increasing integration and regional policy together would
promote greater regional cohesion and enhance the competitive performance of the
poorer, lagging regions, then the lack of any real substantial convergence in productivity
or GDP per head must be disappointing. On the other hand it may be that the EU regional
funds have served to prevent the demand and competitive shocks associated with34
increasing economic integration, technological change and accelerating globalisation
from exacerbating regional inequalities in productive performance.  Or, again, it might be
argued that the scale of EU regional aid has simply not been sufficient to make much of
an impact on productivity convergence across the regions, and that a large financial
commitment  would  have  yielded  the  desired  results.   At  the  very  time  when  the
productive  performance  and  competitiveness  of  the  EU  and  its  regions,  and  the
integration of the new enlargement states into the Union, are rightly of central concern to
the European Commission, it seems that the role, effectiveness and funding of regional
policy are coming under increasingly critical review and reassessment (see, for example,
BOLDRIN and CANOVA, 2001; PUGA, 2002; SAPIR, 2003).   Understanding the
determinants of regional productivity and competitiveness across the EU is thus a highly
pertinent research task.
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